Democracy and Development
Dictatorships and democracies do not differ on the average in their annual rates of growth of total income. Between 1951 and 1999, total GDP grew at the annual rate of 4.4% under dictatorships and 3.69% under democracies. Democracies are much more common in developed countries, where incomes tend to grow more slowly. If we assume that dictatorships exist under the same conditions as democracies, we will conclude that the average rate of growth of total income would have been about 4.24% under dictatorships and 4.06% under democracies — a negligible difference.
Dictatorships and democracies do not differ on the average in their annual rates of growth of total income. Between 1951 and 1999, total GDP grew at the annual rate of 4.4% under dictatorships and 3.69% under democracies. Democracies are much more common in developed countries, where incomes tend to grow more slowly. If we assume that dictatorships exist under the same conditions as democracies, we will conclude that the average rate of growth of total income would have been about 4.24% under dictatorships and 4.06% under democracies — a negligible difference.Mortality rates are higher and life expectancies lower under authoritarian regimes. Fertility and population growth rates are higher under dictatorships. Very poor countries have fertility rates of about six births per woman regardless of their regime, while very wealthy countries converge to replacement fertility rates under both regimes. But within the entire intermediate range, from per capita income of US$1,000 to $12,000 (in 1985 purchasing parity terms), fertility is higher under dictatorships. When regimes are matched for social and economic conditions, statistics reveal that an average woman has one-half of a child more under dictatorship than under democracy.
Dictatorships and democracies do not differ on the average in their annual rates of growth of total income. Between 1951 and 1999, total GDP grew at the annual rate of 4.4% under dictatorships and 3.69% under democracies. Democracies are much more common in developed countries, where incomes tend to grow more slowly. If we assume that dictatorships exist under the same conditions as democracies, we will conclude that the average rate of growth of total income would have been about 4.24% under dictatorships and 4.06% under democracies — a negligible difference.Mortality rates are higher and life expectancies lower under authoritarian regimes. Fertility and population growth rates are higher under dictatorships. Very poor countries have fertility rates of about six births per woman regardless of their regime, while very wealthy countries converge to replacement fertility rates under both regimes. But within the entire intermediate range, from per capita income of US$1,000 to $12,000 (in 1985 purchasing parity terms), fertility is higher under dictatorships. When regimes are matched for social and economic conditions, statistics reveal that an average woman has one-half of a child more under dictatorship than under democracy.The consequence is that per capita, as distinct from total, income grows faster under democracies. The rate of annual growth of per capita income was 1.84% under dictatorships and 2.26% under democracies. Correcting for exogenous conditions, we still conclude that per capita incomes grew at the annual rate of 1.93% under dictatorships and at the rate of 2.11% under democracies.
Of the 100 countries with per capita incomes of less than US$2,000 in 1950 or when they became independent, 56 remained equally poor or even poorer decades later. Some countries developed spectacularly, at least quintupling their per capita incomes. Of this list, Japan, Ireland, and Malta were parliamentary democracies during the entire period. Greece was a parliamentary democracy before and after a period of military rule. Botswana had more than one party with reasonably free elections in which the same party always won an overwhelming majority. Singapore and Malaysia had authoritarian regimes during the entire period. Portugal, Spain, South Korea, and Taiwan proceeded from various forms of dictatorship to different forms of democracy. Finally, Thailand has been so politically unstable that its history cannot be summarized. There is nothing to indicate that it takes one regime or the other to generate spectacular successes.
The list of economic disasters is much longer. 19 countries that were independent before 1990 had lower incomes at the end than at the beginning of the period. Among them, Kiribati and Papua New Guinea were parliamentary democracies throughout. Five countries remained under different dictatorships during the entire period. Seven countries started as authoritarian and ended as democracies, but the transition typically occurred too late to impact observed growth patterns. Somalia began as a democracy and disintegrated under military rule. Finally, Suriname had a convoluted political history. Almost all these countries were ruled by dictatorship during most of their histories, having often experienced periods of civil strife and a lack of political institutions.
Economic growth under dictatorships is highly sensitive to any visible signs of political mobilization and to turnover of heads of government, while under democracy the same phenomena are an expected part of life and have no effect on growth rates. Dictatorships exhibit much higher variance in economic performance.
Democratic regimes are more frequent in the more developed countries, while dictatorships predominate in poor ones.
Taiwan developed under an authoritarian regime, reached an annual per capita income of US$10,610 in 1996, and transitioned to democracy. But this is not evidence of the role of development. By 1996, the Taiwanese regime was 47 years old. If this regime had a 0.0226 chance of collapsing in any random year — the average probability for all dictatorships — it would have had only a 35% chance of surviving past 46 years even if it had remained as poor as it was in 1949. Most likely, the Taiwanese regime decided to hold elections because it needed to mobilize the support of democratic countries in its geopolitical conflict with China, a reason unrelated to development.
Suppose that all dictatorships face the same chance of falling during a particular year for purely idiosyncratic reasons. Some dictatorships succumb to these events, but most escape them. Some of those that manage to survive grow economically. The observed result will be that dictatorships die in countries with high incomes.
Some of the factors that drive the transitions to democracy are related to income. First, countries with intermediate income levels are more likely to have experienced regime transitions in the past, and dictatorships last for shorter periods in countries that have previously experienced democracy. Secondly, dictatorships that emerge at intermediate income levels tend to be military dictatorships, which have shorter lives than civilian ones.
The per capita income thresholds at which democracies emerge vary enormously: India had a per capita income of about US$556 in 1947, the United States had an income of roughly US$1,100 in 1830 — years when both countries established lasting democracies. Meanwhile East Germany, Taiwan, and Singapore remained under the grip of dictatorships even when their incomes surpassed US$10,000.
There is, then, no evidence that democracies are more likely to emerge when a country becomes modernized. Rather, the evidence is overwhelming that if democracy emerges in a country that is already modern, then it is much more likely to survive. No democracy ever fell in a country with a per capita income higher than that of Argentina in 1975 — US$6055. While, throughout history, about 70 democracies have collapsed in poorer countries. In contrast, 35 democracies spent a total of 1,000 years under more affluent conditions, and not one collapsed.
The probability that democracy survives increases monotonically with per capita income. Between 1951 and 1999, the probability that a democracy would fall during any particular year in countries with per capita income under US$1,000 was 0.089, implying that their expected life was about 11 years. With incomes in the range of US$1001 to US$3000, this probability was 0.037, for an expected duration of about 27 years. Between US$3001 and US$6055, the probability was 0.013, which translates into about 78 years of expected life. And above US$6055, no democracies have fallen.
If a dictatorship happens to fall in a country with a low per capita income, democracy is not likely to be long-lived. But if it falls in a more affluent country, democracy endures. Development does not generate democracy; rather democracies accumulate in the more developed countries.
“A Flawed Blueprint,” by Adam Przeworski
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